72trust / 100

Address Poisoning

by Address Poisoning Check in Security & trust

x402 APIPassing, checked 7 h ago

The address-poisoning attack: a scammer sends dust from an address whose first/last characters match one you really use, hoping you copy-paste the poisoned one. An auto-paying agent is the perfect victim. This compares the recipient against the head/tail of addresses the wallet actually transacts with and flags a look-alike that is NOT a real counterparty. Pass wallet= (yours) and to= (the recipient). A heuristic — verify the full address regardless. Not financial advice.

GET
https://402.com.tr/api/x402/address-poisoning
Price
$0.03
per call in USDC
Uptime
100%
last 30 days
Response time
457 ms
648 ms slowest 5%
Last check
Passed
7 h ago, next any minute now

Run a free test callHow to call it

Reliability

All checks passedSome failedAll failedNot checked

Status and outage history · Atom feed · Watch with other listings

How to call it

GET https://402.com.tr/api/x402/address-poisoning

Each call costs $0.03 in USDC on Base, paid with the request over x402.

Run a free test callOne unpaid request, the way an agent sends it. You see the payment challenge it gets back. Nothing is charged.

Example request

From the listing.

GET https://402.com.tr/api/x402/address-poisoning?to=0xcF77a3Ba9A5CA399B7c97c74d54e5b1Beb874E43&wallet=0xFe21a68f21d556A3C4274a44c2Fb5410c50cDa1C

Parameters

ParameterTypeRequiredDescription
tostringYesRecipient you're about to pay
walletstringYesYour wallet (the sender)

Example response

The provider's example. We can't check it without paying.

{
  "checkedAt": "2026-10-11T17:11:56.415Z",
  "daysAnalysed": 90,
  "knownCounterparties": 4,
  "lookalikeMatchesCount": 0,
  "to": "0xcF77a3Ba9A5CA399B7c97c74d54e5b1Beb874E43",
  "verdict": "no_resemblance",
  "wallet": "0xFe21a68f21d556A3C4274a44c2Fb5410c50cDa1C"
}

Call it from code

The curl command shows the payment challenge. The JavaScript and Python versions pay and call, and never pay more than $0.03.

curl: see the payment challenge
# bash or zsh: see the payment challenge. Nothing is charged.
curl -sS -g -i 'https://402.com.tr/api/x402/address-poisoning?to=0xcF77a3Ba9A5CA399B7c97c74d54e5b1Beb874E43&wallet=0xFe21a68f21d556A3C4274a44c2Fb5410c50cDa1C'

# x402 v2 sends the challenge base64-encoded in the PAYMENT-REQUIRED header (v1 sends it in the body).
# To read the header:
curl -sS -g -o /dev/null -D - 'https://402.com.tr/api/x402/address-poisoning?to=0xcF77a3Ba9A5CA399B7c97c74d54e5b1Beb874E43&wallet=0xFe21a68f21d556A3C4274a44c2Fb5410c50cDa1C' \
  | grep -i '^payment-required:' | cut -d' ' -f2 | tr -d '\r' | base64 --decode
JavaScript: pay and call
// npm i @x402/fetch @x402/evm viem
import { wrapFetchWithPayment, x402Client } from "@x402/fetch";
import { registerExactEvmScheme } from "@x402/evm/exact/client";
import { privateKeyToAccount } from "viem/accounts";

// Pays at most $0.03 per call.
const client = new x402Client().setSpendControls({ maxAmountPerPayment: "$0.03" });
registerExactEvmScheme(client, { signer: privateKeyToAccount(process.env.EVM_PRIVATE_KEY) });
const pay = wrapFetchWithPayment(fetch, client);

// Not sure it's safe to pay? ToolVet checks it first for $0.005. Pay for that from a separate
// client: this one is capped at $0.03 per payment. GET https://toolvet.app/api/v1/check?url=https%3A%2F%2F402.com.tr%2Fapi%2Fx402%2Faddress-poisoning
const res = await pay("https://402.com.tr/api/x402/address-poisoning?to=0xcF77a3Ba9A5CA399B7c97c74d54e5b1Beb874E43&wallet=0xFe21a68f21d556A3C4274a44c2Fb5410c50cDa1C");
console.log(res.status, await res.text());
Python: pay and call
# pip install "x402[requests,evm]"
import os
from eth_account import Account
from x402 import x402ClientSync
from x402.http.clients import x402_requests
from x402.mechanisms.evm import EthAccountSigner
from x402.mechanisms.evm.exact.register import register_exact_evm_client

# Pays at most $0.03 per call.
client = x402ClientSync().set_spend_controls({"max_amount_per_payment": "$0.03"})
register_exact_evm_client(client, EthAccountSigner(Account.from_key(os.environ["EVM_PRIVATE_KEY"])))

with x402_requests(client) as session:
    res = session.get("https://402.com.tr/api/x402/address-poisoning?to=0xcF77a3Ba9A5CA399B7c97c74d54e5b1Beb874E43&wallet=0xFe21a68f21d556A3C4274a44c2Fb5410c50cDa1C")
    print(res.status_code, res.text)

Security scan

No findings

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Recent checks

WhenResultHTTPTimePrice
7 h agoPassed402574 ms$0.03
17 h agoPassed402616 ms$0.03
26 h agoPassed402457 ms$0.03
35 h agoPassed402509 ms$0.03
40 h agoPassed402714 ms$0.03
Show 10 older checks
44 h agoPassed402424 ms$0.03
2 days agoPassed402453 ms$0.03
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2 days agoPassed402648 ms$0.03
3 days agoPassed402503 ms$0.03
3 days agoPassed402431 ms$0.03
3 days agoPassed402442 ms$0.03
3 days agoPassed402441 ms$0.03
3 days agoPassed402405 ms$0.03
3 days agoPassed402456 ms$0.03