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Ainote

by ainote.dev in Developer tools

MCP serverPassing, checked 1 h ago

Agent-native notes, tasks, dev-docs, vaults, sync & handoffs. MCP + OpenAPI dual surface.

https://api.ainote.dev/api/mcp

Last 30 days

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Uptime
100%
Response time
297 ms typical, 610 ms slowest 5%
Last check
1 h ago
Next check
in 5 h

How to call it

Add it to any MCP client that supports remote servers.

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "ainote": {
      "type": "http",
      "url": "https://api.ainote.dev/api/mcp"
    }
  }
}

34 tools

  • delete_task

    Soft-delete a task by ID. Destructive but reversible within 30 days (TaskCleanupJob purges trash daily at 2am KST). Returns 404 if the task does not exist or is not owned by the authenticated user.

  • list_papers

    List notes/papers from AI Note. Supports keyword search across title and content, category filtering, pagination, and sorting. Returns id/title/content_preview/category_id/created_at. Use this when the user asks 'find my note about X', 'what did I write on Y', or wants to search

  • project_read

    List the authenticated user's projects (L2 intent layer), or fetch one by id. Each entry includes riskiest_assumption — the single highest-priority unverified assumption (or, if all are verified, the highest-criticality one).

  • project_write

    Create or update a project (L2 intent layer). Omit `id` to create, pass it to update. There is no delete tool — use status: 'archived' to retire a project.

  • assumption_write

    Create or update an assumption under a project (L2 intent layer). Omit `id` to create, pass it to update. There is no delete tool. 🔴 `verdict` is REJECTED with an error if passed — verdict is confirmed only through a human judgment decision (see judgment_submit). This tool can

  • judgment_submit

    Request a human judgment (L3 layer) by attaching evidence — approval, evidence, or verdict. This is the ONLY door an agent has into the judgment queue. 🔴 `decision` is REJECTED with an error if passed — judgments are always created with decision='pending'. Only a human decides

  • judgment_list

    List the authenticated user's own judgments (L3 layer) — use this to check your own blocking status (risk_tier 1 pending = execution blocked). Default order matches the /command queue: risk_tier ascending, then arrival order.

  • delete_dev_doc

    Soft-delete a dev document by title or UUID. Reversible from trash. Pass `category` when multiple docs share the same title across subcategories (memory/claude/cursor/env/docs).

  • get_setup_guide

    Get instructions for setting up AI Note MCP in Claude Desktop, Cursor, or other MCP clients. No authentication required.

  • vault_create

    Create a new private vault as a GitHub repository under the user's account. Requires the user to have completed the GitHub App install flow first.

  • vault_sync

    Wrapper around vault file sync. action=list|pull|push to work against the primary vault. list/pull are paginated — narrow with `path`/`since` and follow `next_cursor` instead of pulling the whole vault. To fetch specific files, pull with `paths` (up to 100 exact paths, one call).

  • sync_push

    Push a markdown file into the primary vault. Optional CAS via base_sha to detect concurrent multi-PC writes (Layer 3 of multi-PC sync plan). WAF-bypass tip: large bodies (~10KB+) that get false-positive blocked at Cloudflare can be sent via `content_b64` (base64-encoded) OR `cont

  • sync_push_batch

    Push MANY files into the primary vault in ONE call. Use this instead of looping sync_push whenever you have more than a couple of changed paths — the cost of sync_push is round trips, not bytes. Per-item semantics are identical to sync_push (Layer 3 base_sha CAS, superseded contr

  • sync_delete

    Delete a file from the primary vault. Optional CAS via base_sha to detect concurrent multi-PC writes. Protected paths (global/memory/, global/skills/, global/planning/, global/intent/, global/claude-config/, handoffs/) require base_sha or explicit force:true (audited). Idempotent

  • sync_audit_layer5

    Record the result of a client-side Layer 5 codex review (sync.py merge gate) as a vault_events row. Body of the review is NOT stored — only an HMAC digest of the summary so operators can correlate without exposing review content. Opt-in: server skips writes (still returns success

  • handoff_save

    Save a session handoff note for cross-device / cross-session continuation. Stored at handoffs/{project}-{topic}-{YYYY-MM-DD}.txt in the user's primary vault. Use the optional `time` param (HHMM, KST) to disambiguate multiple handoffs saved on the same day — it is appended to the

  • graph_soft_delete

    Soft-delete an env_sync graph node (sets deleted_at; .live scope hides it from reads). Idempotent — re-deleting a deleted node is a no-op success.

  • env_sync.secret_push

    Push a new client-encrypted secret. Ciphertext only — server never sees plaintext. Recipients must include the pushing device's own pubkey.

  • env_sync.secret_pull

    Pull an encrypted secret blob. Response is ciphertext_b64 only — server never sees and never returns plaintext.

  • env_sync.secret_rotate

    Rotate a secret: soft-delete the old node, create a new live node with the same alias and the new ciphertext+recipients. 7-day grace before hard delete of old ciphertext bytes.

  • env_sync_txn_push

    Ingest a batched envelope of client-recorded env_sync mutations. HLC-skew gated, partial-success on conflict.

  • env_sync_txn_rollback

    Inverse-apply a prior env_sync transaction. Safety gates: ownership, idempotency, descendant-conflict (force opt-out).

  • tasks_read

    Read tasks and task categories. action: tasks | categories (consolidated surface — same handlers as the legacy tools)

  • task_write

    Create or update a task. action: create | update. Deletion is a separate tool (delete_task). (consolidated surface — same handlers as the legacy tools) Required per action — create: content | update: id.

  • dev_docs_read

    Read dev docs. action: get | list | categories | pull (consolidated surface — same handlers as the legacy tools)

  • dev_doc_write

    Create or update a dev doc. action: create | update. Deletion is a separate tool (delete_dev_doc). (consolidated surface — same handlers as the legacy tools) Required per action — create: title, content | update: content.

  • sync_read

    Read-only vault sync operations. action: list | pull | diff | merge | conflicts. Writes (push/delete) are separate tools — they carry CAS semantics. (consolidated surface — same handlers as the legacy tools) Required per action — diff: path | merge: path, base_text, local_text.

  • vault_read

    Read vault metadata. action: list | clone | status (consolidated surface — same handlers as the legacy tools) Required per action — clone: name.

  • env_sync_read

    Read env-sync state. action: devices | drift | status | txn_pull. Secret reads are a separate tool (env_sync.secret_pull). (consolidated surface — same handlers as the legacy tools)

  • env_sync_write

    Non-destructive env-sync writes. action: enroll | request_share | heartbeat. Secret push/rotate are separate tools. (consolidated surface — same handlers as the legacy tools) Required per action — enroll: alias, age_pubkey, enrollment_token | request_share: target_device_id, secr

  • graph_read

    Read knowledge-graph nodes. action: get | list (consolidated surface — same handlers as the legacy tools)

  • graph_write

    Add or update a graph entity. action: add | update. Deletion is a separate tool (graph_soft_delete). (consolidated surface — same handlers as the legacy tools) Required per action — add: node_type, alias, payload, device_id | update: node_id, device_id, field_updates.

  • handoff_read

    Read session handoffs. action: get | list (consolidated surface — same handlers as the legacy tools) Required per action — get: project, topic.

  • memory_read

    Read agent memory. action: get | search (consolidated surface — same handlers as the legacy tools) Required per action — get: source | search: query.

Security scan

  • No findings. We scan names, descriptions and tool definitions for hidden instructions and other prompt-injection patterns.

Recent checks

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30 h agoPassed200722 ms