76trust / 100

Audio Speech

by DexL Agents in AI models & inference

x402 APIPassing, checked 4 h ago

Turn text into speech and get a WAV back: eight voices, 24 kHz mono, up to 5000 characters per call. Priced per call with x402, and the quote is a ceiling - pay with the upto scheme and only the audio you actually generated settles.

POST
https://agents.dexl.io/v1/audio/speech
Price
$0.001
per call in USDC
Uptime
93.5%
last 30 days
Response time
675 ms
1.0 s slowest 5%
Last check
Passed
4 h ago, next any minute now

Run a free test callHow to call it

Reliability

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Status and outage history · Atom feed · Watch with other listings

How to call it

POST https://agents.dexl.io/v1/audio/speech

Each call costs $0.001 in USDC on Base, paid with the request over x402.

Run a free test callOne unpaid request, the way an agent sends it. You see the payment challenge it gets back. Nothing is charged.

Example request

From the listing.

POST https://agents.dexl.io/v1/audio/speech
content-type: application/json

{
  "input": "The queue lives in the database.",
  "voice": "Kore"
}

Parameters

ParameterTypeRequiredDescription
inputstringYesText to speak, up to 5000 characters.
voicestringNoOne of: Kore, Puck, Charon, Fenrir, Aoede, Leda, Orus, Zephyr.

Example response

The listing has no example response.

Call it from code

The curl command shows the payment challenge. The JavaScript and Python versions pay and call, and never pay more than $0.001.

The code pays $0.001 in USDC on Base instead: it uses a payment scheme other than exact, which needs a different client setup.

curl: see the payment challenge
# bash or zsh: see the payment challenge. Nothing is charged.
curl -sS -g -i -X POST 'https://agents.dexl.io/v1/audio/speech' \
  -H 'content-type: application/json' \
  --data-raw '{"input":"The queue lives in the database.","voice":"Kore"}'

# x402 v2 sends the challenge base64-encoded in the PAYMENT-REQUIRED header (v1 sends it in the body).
# To read the header:
curl -sS -g -o /dev/null -D - -X POST 'https://agents.dexl.io/v1/audio/speech' \
  -H 'content-type: application/json' \
  --data-raw '{"input":"The queue lives in the database.","voice":"Kore"}' \
  | grep -i '^payment-required:' | cut -d' ' -f2 | tr -d '\r' | base64 --decode
JavaScript: pay and call
// npm i @x402/fetch @x402/evm viem
import { wrapFetchWithPayment, x402Client } from "@x402/fetch";
import { registerExactEvmScheme } from "@x402/evm/exact/client";
import { privateKeyToAccount } from "viem/accounts";

// Pays at most $0.001 per call.
const client = new x402Client().setSpendControls({ maxAmountPerPayment: "$0.001" });
registerExactEvmScheme(client, { signer: privateKeyToAccount(process.env.EVM_PRIVATE_KEY) });
const pay = wrapFetchWithPayment(fetch, client);

// Not sure it's safe to pay? ToolVet checks it first for $0.005. Pay for that from a separate
// client: this one is capped at $0.001 per payment. GET https://toolvet.app/api/v1/check?url=https%3A%2F%2Fagents.dexl.io%2Fv1%2Faudio%2Fspeech&method=POST
const res = await pay("https://agents.dexl.io/v1/audio/speech", {
  method: "POST",
  headers: { "content-type": "application/json" },
  body: JSON.stringify({
    "input": "The queue lives in the database.",
    "voice": "Kore"
  }),
});
console.log(res.status, await res.text());
Python: pay and call
# pip install "x402[requests,evm]"
import os
from eth_account import Account
from x402 import x402ClientSync
from x402.http.clients import x402_requests
from x402.mechanisms.evm import EthAccountSigner
from x402.mechanisms.evm.exact.register import register_exact_evm_client

# Pays at most $0.001 per call.
client = x402ClientSync().set_spend_controls({"max_amount_per_payment": "$0.001"})
register_exact_evm_client(client, EthAccountSigner(Account.from_key(os.environ["EVM_PRIVATE_KEY"])))

with x402_requests(client) as session:
    res = session.post(
        "https://agents.dexl.io/v1/audio/speech",
        json={
            "input": "The queue lives in the database.",
            "voice": "Kore",
        },
    )
    print(res.status_code, res.text)

Security scan

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