75trust / 100

Audit A11y

by Saylor Innovations Audits in Security & trust

x402 APIPassing, checked 2 h ago

Accessibility audit of a web page - missing alt text, unlabeled forms, link names, headings and a score

GET https://saylorinnovations.com/api/audit/a11y

Last 30 days

All checks passedSome failedAll failedNot checked

Status and outage history · Atom feed

Uptime
100%
Response time
561 ms typical, 1.4 s slowest 5%
Last check
2 h ago
Next check
any minute now

How to call it

GET https://saylorinnovations.com/api/audit/a11y

Each call costs $0.01 in USDC on Base, paid with the request over x402.

Run a free test callOne unpaid request, the way an agent sends it. You see the payment challenge it gets back. Nothing is charged.

Example request

From the listing.

GET https://saylorinnovations.com/api/audit/a11y?url=https%3A%2F%2Fsaylorinnovations.com

Parameters

ParameterTypeRequiredDescription
urlstringNoPublic page URL or domain to audit

Example response

The provider's example. We can't check it without paying.

Example response, 32 lines
{
  "elements": {
    "form_controls": 2,
    "headings": 5,
    "images": 4,
    "links": 12
  },
  "grade": "B",
  "http_status": 200,
  "issues": [
    {
      "count": 1,
      "detail": "1 of 4 images have no alt attribute",
      "id": "image-alt",
      "impact": "critical",
      "samples": [
        "<img src=\"/hero.png\">"
      ],
      "wcag": "1.1.1"
    }
  ],
  "scope": "static HTML only: no JavaScript rendering, keyboard, colour-contrast or screen-reader testing. A clean result is not WCAG conformance.",
  "score": 86,
  "summary": {
    "checks_failed": 2,
    "critical": 1,
    "minor": 0,
    "moderate": 1,
    "serious": 0
  },
  "url": "https://example.com/"
}

Call it from code

The curl command shows the payment challenge. The JavaScript and Python versions pay and call, and never pay more than $0.01.

curl: see the payment challenge
# bash or zsh: see the payment challenge. Nothing is charged.
curl -sS -g -i 'https://saylorinnovations.com/api/audit/a11y?url=https%3A%2F%2Fsaylorinnovations.com'

# x402 v2 sends the challenge base64-encoded in the PAYMENT-REQUIRED header (v1 sends it in the body).
# To read the header:
curl -sS -g -o /dev/null -D - 'https://saylorinnovations.com/api/audit/a11y?url=https%3A%2F%2Fsaylorinnovations.com' \
  | grep -i '^payment-required:' | cut -d' ' -f2 | tr -d '\r' | base64 --decode
JavaScript: pay and call
// npm i @x402/fetch @x402/evm viem
import { wrapFetchWithPayment, x402Client } from "@x402/fetch";
import { registerExactEvmScheme } from "@x402/evm/exact/client";
import { privateKeyToAccount } from "viem/accounts";

// Pays at most $0.01 per call.
const client = new x402Client().setSpendControls({ maxAmountPerPayment: "$0.01" });
registerExactEvmScheme(client, { signer: privateKeyToAccount(process.env.EVM_PRIVATE_KEY) });
const pay = wrapFetchWithPayment(fetch, client);

// Not sure it's safe to pay? ToolVet checks it first for $0.005. Pay for that from a separate
// client: this one is capped at $0.01 per payment. GET https://toolvet.app/api/v1/check?url=https%3A%2F%2Fsaylorinnovations.com%2Fapi%2Faudit%2Fa11y
const res = await pay("https://saylorinnovations.com/api/audit/a11y?url=https%3A%2F%2Fsaylorinnovations.com");
console.log(res.status, await res.text());
Python: pay and call
# pip install "x402[requests,evm]"
import os
from eth_account import Account
from x402 import x402ClientSync
from x402.http.clients import x402_requests
from x402.mechanisms.evm import EthAccountSigner
from x402.mechanisms.evm.exact.register import register_exact_evm_client

# Pays at most $0.01 per call.
client = x402ClientSync().set_spend_controls({"max_amount_per_payment": "$0.01"})
register_exact_evm_client(client, EthAccountSigner(Account.from_key(os.environ["EVM_PRIVATE_KEY"])))

with x402_requests(client) as session:
    res = session.get("https://saylorinnovations.com/api/audit/a11y?url=https%3A%2F%2Fsaylorinnovations.com")
    print(res.status_code, res.text)

Security scan

  • No findings. We scan names, descriptions and tool definitions for hidden instructions and other prompt-injection patterns.

Recent checks

WhenResultHTTPTimePrice
2 h agoPassed4021.3 s$0.01
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