72trust / 100

B20 Authenticity

by B20 Authenticity Check in Onchain & crypto

x402 APIPassing, checked 5 h ago

๐Ÿ†• Run FIRST on any 'B20'. A scammer can deploy a normal contract at a vanity 0xB200โ€ฆ address and fake the whole B20 read surface โ€” the B20Factory precompile is the one authority that can't be spoofed. Verifies factory registration + bytecode absence (real B20s are chain-native precompiles with no code). verdict: genuine / fake_lookalike / not_b20. The 2-cent check that keeps every other B20 answer honest.

GET
https://402.com.tr/api/x402/b20-authenticity
Price
$0.02
per call in USDC
Uptime
100%
last 30 days
Response time
473 ms
613 ms slowest 5%
Last check
Passed
5 h ago, next in 1 h

Run a free test callHow to call it

Reliability

All checks passedSome failedAll failedNot checked

Status and outage history ยท Atom feed ยท Watch with other listings

How to call it

GET https://402.com.tr/api/x402/b20-authenticity

Each call costs $0.02 in USDC on Base, paid with the request over x402.

Run a free test callOne unpaid request, the way an agent sends it. You see the payment challenge it gets back. Nothing is charged.

Example request

From the listing.

GET https://402.com.tr/api/x402/b20-authenticity?address=0xb20000000000000000000186a08e781c38059eec

Parameters

ParameterTypeRequiredDescription
addressstringYesToken address

Example response

The provider's example. We can't check it without paying.

{
  "address": "0xb20000000000000000000186a08e781c38059eeC",
  "checkedAt": "2026-10-11T17:17:18.486Z",
  "factoryConfirms": true,
  "hasBytecode": true,
  "initialized": true,
  "prefixLooksB20": true,
  "verdict": "genuine"
}

Call it from code

The curl command shows the payment challenge. The JavaScript and Python versions pay and call, and never pay more than $0.02.

curl: see the payment challenge
# bash or zsh: see the payment challenge. Nothing is charged.
curl -sS -g -i 'https://402.com.tr/api/x402/b20-authenticity?address=0xb20000000000000000000186a08e781c38059eec'

# x402 v2 sends the challenge base64-encoded in the PAYMENT-REQUIRED header (v1 sends it in the body).
# To read the header:
curl -sS -g -o /dev/null -D - 'https://402.com.tr/api/x402/b20-authenticity?address=0xb20000000000000000000186a08e781c38059eec' \
  | grep -i '^payment-required:' | cut -d' ' -f2 | tr -d '\r' | base64 --decode
JavaScript: pay and call
// npm i @x402/fetch @x402/evm viem
import { wrapFetchWithPayment, x402Client } from "@x402/fetch";
import { registerExactEvmScheme } from "@x402/evm/exact/client";
import { privateKeyToAccount } from "viem/accounts";

// Pays at most $0.02 per call.
const client = new x402Client().setSpendControls({ maxAmountPerPayment: "$0.02" });
registerExactEvmScheme(client, { signer: privateKeyToAccount(process.env.EVM_PRIVATE_KEY) });
const pay = wrapFetchWithPayment(fetch, client);

// Not sure it's safe to pay? ToolVet checks it first for $0.005. Pay for that from a separate
// client: this one is capped at $0.02 per payment. GET https://toolvet.app/api/v1/check?url=https%3A%2F%2F402.com.tr%2Fapi%2Fx402%2Fb20-authenticity
const res = await pay("https://402.com.tr/api/x402/b20-authenticity?address=0xb20000000000000000000186a08e781c38059eec");
console.log(res.status, await res.text());
Python: pay and call
# pip install "x402[requests,evm]"
import os
from eth_account import Account
from x402 import x402ClientSync
from x402.http.clients import x402_requests
from x402.mechanisms.evm import EthAccountSigner
from x402.mechanisms.evm.exact.register import register_exact_evm_client

# Pays at most $0.02 per call.
client = x402ClientSync().set_spend_controls({"max_amount_per_payment": "$0.02"})
register_exact_evm_client(client, EthAccountSigner(Account.from_key(os.environ["EVM_PRIVATE_KEY"])))

with x402_requests(client) as session:
    res = session.get("https://402.com.tr/api/x402/b20-authenticity?address=0xb20000000000000000000186a08e781c38059eec")
    print(res.status_code, res.text)

Security scan

No findings

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Recent checks

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5 h agoPassed402565 ms$0.02
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4 days agoPassed402442 ms$0.02