77trust / 100

B20 Config Audit

by B20 Config Audit in Onchain & crypto

x402 APIPassing, checked 4 h ago

๐Ÿ†• The B20 misconfiguration lint. Base's docs warn: a scope bound to a NON-EXISTENT allowlist silently denies EVERYONE โ€” transfers brick. Audits every policy scope for dangling bindings, ALWAYS_BLOCK, renounced (frozen) lists and live pauses; verdict bricked / critical_misconfig / misconfigured / clean plus a can-this-token-even-move flag. Pre-launch lint for issuers, stuck-funds guard for holders and merchants.

GET
https://402.com.tr/api/x402/b20-config-audit
Price
$0.05
per call in USDC
Uptime
100%
last 30 days
Response time
471 ms
810 ms slowest 5%
Last check
Passed
4 h ago, next any minute now

Run a free test callHow to call it

Reliability

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How to call it

GET https://402.com.tr/api/x402/b20-config-audit

Each call costs $0.05 in USDC on Base, paid with the request over x402.

Run a free test callOne unpaid request, the way an agent sends it. You see the payment challenge it gets back. Nothing is charged.

Example request

From the listing.

GET https://402.com.tr/api/x402/b20-config-audit?address=0xb20000000000000000000186a08e781c38059eec

Parameters

ParameterTypeRequiredDescription
addressstringYesB20 token address

Example response

The provider's example. We can't check it without paying.

{
  "address": "0xb20000000000000000000186a08e781c38059eec",
  "checkedAt": "2026-10-11T17:17:22.093Z",
  "findingsCount": 0,
  "isB20": true,
  "symbol": "NADT",
  "transferDead": false,
  "variant": "stablecoin",
  "verdict": "clean"
}

Call it from code

The curl command shows the payment challenge. The JavaScript and Python versions pay and call, and never pay more than $0.05.

curl: see the payment challenge
# bash or zsh: see the payment challenge. Nothing is charged.
curl -sS -g -i 'https://402.com.tr/api/x402/b20-config-audit?address=0xb20000000000000000000186a08e781c38059eec'

# x402 v2 sends the challenge base64-encoded in the PAYMENT-REQUIRED header (v1 sends it in the body).
# To read the header:
curl -sS -g -o /dev/null -D - 'https://402.com.tr/api/x402/b20-config-audit?address=0xb20000000000000000000186a08e781c38059eec' \
  | grep -i '^payment-required:' | cut -d' ' -f2 | tr -d '\r' | base64 --decode
JavaScript: pay and call
// npm i @x402/fetch @x402/evm viem
import { wrapFetchWithPayment, x402Client } from "@x402/fetch";
import { registerExactEvmScheme } from "@x402/evm/exact/client";
import { privateKeyToAccount } from "viem/accounts";

// Pays at most $0.05 per call.
const client = new x402Client().setSpendControls({ maxAmountPerPayment: "$0.05" });
registerExactEvmScheme(client, { signer: privateKeyToAccount(process.env.EVM_PRIVATE_KEY) });
const pay = wrapFetchWithPayment(fetch, client);

// Not sure it's safe to pay? ToolVet checks it first for $0.005. Pay for that from a separate
// client: this one is capped at $0.05 per payment. GET https://toolvet.app/api/v1/check?url=https%3A%2F%2F402.com.tr%2Fapi%2Fx402%2Fb20-config-audit
const res = await pay("https://402.com.tr/api/x402/b20-config-audit?address=0xb20000000000000000000186a08e781c38059eec");
console.log(res.status, await res.text());
Python: pay and call
# pip install "x402[requests,evm]"
import os
from eth_account import Account
from x402 import x402ClientSync
from x402.http.clients import x402_requests
from x402.mechanisms.evm import EthAccountSigner
from x402.mechanisms.evm.exact.register import register_exact_evm_client

# Pays at most $0.05 per call.
client = x402ClientSync().set_spend_controls({"max_amount_per_payment": "$0.05"})
register_exact_evm_client(client, EthAccountSigner(Account.from_key(os.environ["EVM_PRIVATE_KEY"])))

with x402_requests(client) as session:
    res = session.get("https://402.com.tr/api/x402/b20-config-audit?address=0xb20000000000000000000186a08e781c38059eec")
    print(res.status_code, res.text)

Security scan

No findings

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