ToolVet
75trust / 100

Chain Address Poisoning

by Tanod chainpeek in Onchain & crypto

x402 APIPassing, checked 48 min ago

chainpeek (Tanod) address-poisoning check before a token transfer: is the recipient a lookalike (same first and last 4 hex characters) of an address in the sender's history or contacts? Use when an agent is about to send USDC or a token and must check the recipient is not an address-poisoning lookalike.

POST https://tanod.dev/v1/chain/address-poisoning

Last 30 days

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Status and outage history · Atom feed

Uptime
100%
Response time
475 ms typical, 1.0 s slowest 5%
Last check
48 min ago
Next check
any minute now

How to call it

POST https://tanod.dev/v1/chain/address-poisoning

Each call costs $0.002 in USDC on Base, paid with the request over x402.

Run a free test callOne unpaid request, the way an agent sends it. You see the payment challenge it gets back. Nothing is charged.

Example request

From the listing.

POST https://tanod.dev/v1/chain/address-poisoning
content-type: application/json

{
  "chain": "base",
  "from": "0x5A0b54D5dc17e0AadC383d2db43B0a0D3E029c4c",
  "to": "0x7A25e8814F0C6D3B2a9e7f15C08D64B2A91EC4d3"
}

Parameters

ParameterTypeRequiredDescription
chainstringYesethereum, base or robinhood (Robinhood Chain, chain id 4663). One of: ethereum, base, robinhood.
contactsarray of string or nullNoUp to 100 addresses you trust (your address book); `to` is compared with them too, without any chain read. Default: null.
dust_thresholdnumber or nullNoIncoming transfers below this many token units count as dust. Default 0.01 for USDC and USDT; off for other tokens unless set; 0 turns it off. Default: null.
fromstringYesThe sending wallet whose transfer history is read (0x + 40 hex).
lookback_blocksintegerNoHow many of the latest blocks of history to read (0-2,000; default 2,000, about 67 minutes on Base and 6.7 hours on Ethereum). 0 reads nothing and checks `contacts` only. Default: 2000.
tostringYesThe recipient about to be paid (0x + 40 hex). Must differ from `from`.
tokenstringNoUSDC (default), USDT, or a token contract address. Only this token's transfers are read. On robinhood pass a contract address. Default: "USDC".

Example response

The provider's example. We can't check it without paying.

Example response, 37 lines
{
  "chain": "base",
  "contacts_checked": 0,
  "decimals": 6,
  "dust_threshold": "0.01",
  "dust_threshold_raw": "10000",
  "from": "0x5A0b54D5dc17e0AadC383d2db43B0…",
  "history": {
    "blocks": 2000,
    "from_block": 52510001,
    "read": true,
    "to_block": 52512000
  },
  "limits": [
    "Only the transfers of this one…"
  ],
  "matches": [],
  "matches_total": 1,
  "reasons": [],
  "risk": "high",
  "rpc_calls": 3,
  "rules": {
    "paid": "`from` sent the address a non-z…",
    "prefix_chars": 4,
    "suffix_chars": 4,
    "zero_value": "a transfer of 0, either directi…"
  },
  "to": "0x7A25e8814F0C6D3B2a9e7f15C08D6…",
  "to_history": {
    "paid": false,
    "payments": 0,
    "received": 0,
    "seen": true
  },
  "token": "0x833589fCD6eDb6E08f4c7C32D4f71…",
  "token_symbol": "USDC"
}

Call it from code

The curl command shows the payment challenge. The JavaScript and Python versions pay and call, and never pay more than $0.002.

curl: see the payment challenge
# bash or zsh: see the payment challenge. Nothing is charged.
curl -sS -g -i -X POST 'https://tanod.dev/v1/chain/address-poisoning' \
  -H 'content-type: application/json' \
  --data-raw '{"chain":"base","from":"0x5A0b54D5dc17e0AadC383d2db43B0a0D3E029c4c","to":"0x7A25e8814F0C6D3B2a9e7f15C08D64B2A91EC4d3"}'

# x402 v2 sends the challenge base64-encoded in the PAYMENT-REQUIRED header (v1 sends it in the body).
# To read the header:
curl -sS -g -o /dev/null -D - -X POST 'https://tanod.dev/v1/chain/address-poisoning' \
  -H 'content-type: application/json' \
  --data-raw '{"chain":"base","from":"0x5A0b54D5dc17e0AadC383d2db43B0a0D3E029c4c","to":"0x7A25e8814F0C6D3B2a9e7f15C08D64B2A91EC4d3"}' \
  | grep -i '^payment-required:' | cut -d' ' -f2 | tr -d '\r' | base64 --decode
JavaScript: pay and call
// npm i @x402/fetch @x402/evm viem
import { wrapFetchWithPayment, x402Client } from "@x402/fetch";
import { registerExactEvmScheme } from "@x402/evm/exact/client";
import { privateKeyToAccount } from "viem/accounts";

// Pays at most $0.002 per call.
const client = new x402Client().setSpendControls({ maxAmountPerPayment: "$0.002" });
registerExactEvmScheme(client, { signer: privateKeyToAccount(process.env.EVM_PRIVATE_KEY) });
const pay = wrapFetchWithPayment(fetch, client);

// Not sure it's safe to pay? ToolVet checks it first for $0.005. Pay for that from a separate
// client: this one is capped at $0.002 per payment. GET https://toolvet.app/api/v1/check?url=https%3A%2F%2Ftanod.dev%2Fv1%2Fchain%2Faddress-poisoning&method=POST
const res = await pay("https://tanod.dev/v1/chain/address-poisoning", {
  method: "POST",
  headers: { "content-type": "application/json" },
  body: JSON.stringify({
    "chain": "base",
    "from": "0x5A0b54D5dc17e0AadC383d2db43B0a0D3E029c4c",
    "to": "0x7A25e8814F0C6D3B2a9e7f15C08D64B2A91EC4d3"
  }),
});
console.log(res.status, await res.text());
Python: pay and call
# pip install "x402[requests,evm]"
import os
from eth_account import Account
from x402 import x402ClientSync
from x402.http.clients import x402_requests
from x402.mechanisms.evm import EthAccountSigner
from x402.mechanisms.evm.exact.register import register_exact_evm_client

# Pays at most $0.002 per call.
client = x402ClientSync().set_spend_controls({"max_amount_per_payment": "$0.002"})
register_exact_evm_client(client, EthAccountSigner(Account.from_key(os.environ["EVM_PRIVATE_KEY"])))

with x402_requests(client) as session:
    res = session.post(
        "https://tanod.dev/v1/chain/address-poisoning",
        json={
            "chain": "base",
            "from": "0x5A0b54D5dc17e0AadC383d2db43B0a0D3E029c4c",
            "to": "0x7A25e8814F0C6D3B2a9e7f15C08D64B2A91EC4d3",
        },
    )
    print(res.status_code, res.text)

Security scan

  • No findings. We scan names, descriptions and tool definitions for hidden instructions and other prompt-injection patterns.

Recent checks

WhenResultHTTPTimePrice
48 min agoPassed4021.0 s$0.002
5 h agoPassed4021.0 s$0.002
9 h agoPassed402475 ms$0.002
18 h agoPassed402272 ms$0.002