ToolVet
80trust / 100

Chain Token

by Tanod chainpeek in Onchain & crypto

x402 APIPassing, checked 18 min ago

chainpeek (Tanod) ERC-20 token metadata: name, symbol, decimals and total supply on Ethereum or Base, or is_erc20:false. On-chain strings are attacker-controlled.

POST https://tanod.dev/v1/chain/token

Last 30 days

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Status and outage history · Atom feed

Uptime
100%
Response time
271 ms typical, 840 ms slowest 5%
Last check
18 min ago
Next check
in 15 min

How to call it

POST https://tanod.dev/v1/chain/token

Each call costs $0.003 in USDC on Base, paid with the request over x402.

Run a free test callOne unpaid request, the way an agent sends it. You see the payment challenge it gets back. Nothing is charged.

Example request

From the listing.

POST https://tanod.dev/v1/chain/token
content-type: application/json

{
  "address": "0x833589fCD6eDb6E08f4c7C32D4f71b54bdA02913",
  "chain": "base"
}

Parameters

ParameterTypeRequiredDescription
addressstringYesToken contract address (0x + 40 hex).
chainstringYesChain to read. One of: ethereum, base.

Example response

The provider's example. We can't check it without paying.

{
  "address": "0x833589fCD6eDb6E08f4c7C32D4f71b54bdA02913",
  "chain": "base",
  "decimals": 6,
  "is_erc20": true,
  "name": "USD Coin",
  "symbol": "USDC",
  "total_supply": "4440602565.916867",
  "total_supply_raw": "4440602565916867"
}

Call it from code

The curl command shows the payment challenge. The JavaScript and Python versions pay and call, and never pay more than $0.003.

curl: see the payment challenge
# bash or zsh: see the payment challenge. Nothing is charged.
curl -sS -g -i -X POST 'https://tanod.dev/v1/chain/token' \
  -H 'content-type: application/json' \
  --data-raw '{"address":"0x833589fCD6eDb6E08f4c7C32D4f71b54bdA02913","chain":"base"}'

# x402 v2 sends the challenge base64-encoded in the PAYMENT-REQUIRED header (v1 sends it in the body).
# To read the header:
curl -sS -g -o /dev/null -D - -X POST 'https://tanod.dev/v1/chain/token' \
  -H 'content-type: application/json' \
  --data-raw '{"address":"0x833589fCD6eDb6E08f4c7C32D4f71b54bdA02913","chain":"base"}' \
  | grep -i '^payment-required:' | cut -d' ' -f2 | tr -d '\r' | base64 --decode
JavaScript: pay and call
// npm i @x402/fetch @x402/evm viem
import { wrapFetchWithPayment, x402Client } from "@x402/fetch";
import { registerExactEvmScheme } from "@x402/evm/exact/client";
import { privateKeyToAccount } from "viem/accounts";

// Pays at most $0.003 per call.
const client = new x402Client().setSpendControls({ maxAmountPerPayment: "$0.003" });
registerExactEvmScheme(client, { signer: privateKeyToAccount(process.env.EVM_PRIVATE_KEY) });
const pay = wrapFetchWithPayment(fetch, client);

// Not sure it's safe to pay? ToolVet checks it first for $0.005. Pay for that from a separate
// client: this one is capped at $0.003 per payment. GET https://toolvet.app/api/v1/check?url=https%3A%2F%2Ftanod.dev%2Fv1%2Fchain%2Ftoken&method=POST
const res = await pay("https://tanod.dev/v1/chain/token", {
  method: "POST",
  headers: { "content-type": "application/json" },
  body: JSON.stringify({
    "address": "0x833589fCD6eDb6E08f4c7C32D4f71b54bdA02913",
    "chain": "base"
  }),
});
console.log(res.status, await res.text());
Python: pay and call
# pip install "x402[requests,evm]"
import os
from eth_account import Account
from x402 import x402ClientSync
from x402.http.clients import x402_requests
from x402.mechanisms.evm import EthAccountSigner
from x402.mechanisms.evm.exact.register import register_exact_evm_client

# Pays at most $0.003 per call.
client = x402ClientSync().set_spend_controls({"max_amount_per_payment": "$0.003"})
register_exact_evm_client(client, EthAccountSigner(Account.from_key(os.environ["EVM_PRIVATE_KEY"])))

with x402_requests(client) as session:
    res = session.post(
        "https://tanod.dev/v1/chain/token",
        json={
            "address": "0x833589fCD6eDb6E08f4c7C32D4f71b54bdA02913",
            "chain": "base",
        },
    )
    print(res.status_code, res.text)

Security scan

  • No findings. We scan names, descriptions and tool definitions for hidden instructions and other prompt-injection patterns.

Recent checks

WhenResultHTTPTimePrice
18 min agoPassed402275 ms$0.003
4 h agoPassed402275 ms$0.003
8 h agoPassed402261 ms$0.003
12 h agoPassed402271 ms$0.003
16 h agoPassed4021.3 s$0.003
20 h agoPassed402270 ms$0.003
24 h agoPassed402268 ms$0.003
27 h agoPassed402311 ms$0.003
31 h agoPassed402284 ms$0.003
35 h agoPassed402268 ms$0.003
38 h agoPassed402264 ms$0.003
42 h agoPassed402275 ms$0.003
45 h agoPassed402840 ms$0.003
2 days agoPassed402352 ms$0.003
2 days agoPassed402269 ms$0.003