73trust / 100

Cnpj

by MiniFrame Tools in Company & people data

x402 APIPassing, checked 12 min ago

Look up a Brazilian company by CNPJ (public registry). JSON body { cnpj }. Returns name, status, address, CNAE activities, share capital and public partners (QSA) with masked tax IDs; personal contact fields omitted.

POST https://tools.miniframe.com.br/cnpj

Last 30 days

All checks passedSome failedAll failedNot checked
Uptime
100%
Response time
885 ms typical, 1.0 s slowest 5%
Last check
12 min ago
Next check
in 21 min

How to call it

POST https://tools.miniframe.com.br/cnpj

Each call costs $0.01 in USDC on Base, paid with the request over x402.

Run a free test callOne unpaid request, the way an agent sends it. You see the payment challenge it gets back. Nothing is charged.

Example request

From the listing.

POST https://tools.miniframe.com.br/cnpj
content-type: application/json

{
  "cnpj": "00000000000191"
}

Parameters

ParameterTypeRequiredDescription
cnpjstringYesBrazilian company tax ID, 14 digits (with or without punctuation).

Example response

The provider's example. We can't check it without paying.

{
  "address": {
    "city": "São Paulo",
    "state": "SP",
    "zip": "01310100"
  },
  "cnpj": "00000000000191",
  "company_name": "BANCO DO BRASIL SA",
  "is_mei": false,
  "main_activity": {
    "code": 6422100,
    "description": "Bancos múltiplos"
  },
  "partners": [
    {
      "name": "FULANO DE TAL",
      "role": "Diretor",
      "tax_id_masked": "***550179**"
    }
  ],
  "size": "DEMAIS",
  "source": "brasilapi",
  "status": "ATIVA"
}

Call it from code

The curl command shows the payment challenge. The JavaScript and Python versions pay and call, and never pay more than $0.01.

curl: see the payment challenge
# bash or zsh: see the payment challenge. Nothing is charged.
curl -sS -g -i -X POST 'https://tools.miniframe.com.br/cnpj' \
  -H 'content-type: application/json' \
  --data-raw '{"cnpj":"00000000000191"}'

# x402 v2 sends the challenge base64-encoded in the PAYMENT-REQUIRED header (v1 sends it in the body).
# To read the header:
curl -sS -g -o /dev/null -D - -X POST 'https://tools.miniframe.com.br/cnpj' \
  -H 'content-type: application/json' \
  --data-raw '{"cnpj":"00000000000191"}' \
  | grep -i '^payment-required:' | cut -d' ' -f2 | tr -d '\r' | base64 --decode
JavaScript: pay and call
// npm i @x402/fetch @x402/evm viem
import { wrapFetchWithPayment, x402Client } from "@x402/fetch";
import { registerExactEvmScheme } from "@x402/evm/exact/client";
import { privateKeyToAccount } from "viem/accounts";

// Pays at most $0.01 per call.
const client = new x402Client().setSpendControls({ maxAmountPerPayment: "$0.01" });
registerExactEvmScheme(client, { signer: privateKeyToAccount(process.env.EVM_PRIVATE_KEY) });
const pay = wrapFetchWithPayment(fetch, client);

// Not sure it's safe to pay? ToolVet checks it first for $0.005. Pay for that from a separate
// client: this one is capped at $0.01 per payment. GET https://toolvet.app/api/v1/check?url=https%3A%2F%2Ftools.miniframe.com.br%2Fcnpj&method=POST
const res = await pay("https://tools.miniframe.com.br/cnpj", {
  method: "POST",
  headers: { "content-type": "application/json" },
  body: JSON.stringify({
    "cnpj": "00000000000191"
  }),
});
console.log(res.status, await res.text());
Python: pay and call
# pip install "x402[requests,evm]"
import os
from eth_account import Account
from x402 import x402ClientSync
from x402.http.clients import x402_requests
from x402.mechanisms.evm import EthAccountSigner
from x402.mechanisms.evm.exact.register import register_exact_evm_client

# Pays at most $0.01 per call.
client = x402ClientSync().set_spend_controls({"max_amount_per_payment": "$0.01"})
register_exact_evm_client(client, EthAccountSigner(Account.from_key(os.environ["EVM_PRIVATE_KEY"])))

with x402_requests(client) as session:
    res = session.post(
        "https://tools.miniframe.com.br/cnpj",
        json={
            "cnpj": "00000000000191",
        },
    )
    print(res.status_code, res.text)

Security scan

  • No findings. We scan names, descriptions and tool definitions for hidden instructions and other prompt-injection patterns.

Recent checks

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