77trust / 100

Commerce Operator Audit

by Payment Operator Audit in Onchain & crypto

x402 APIPassing, checked 3 h ago

๐Ÿ†• Commerce Payments flows are DRIVEN by an operator โ€” it authorizes escrow, captures for merchants and takes the fees. This audits one before you rely on it: 90-day volumes, fees taken, capture-vs-reclaim record (missed capture windows = merchants left unpaid), distinct payers and merchants. verdict: healthy_operator / mixed / sloppy_operator / no_activity. No other tool reads this new Base commerce protocol.

GET
https://402.com.tr/api/x402/commerce-operator-audit
Price
$0.05
per call in USDC
Uptime
100%
last 30 days
Response time
464 ms
569 ms slowest 5%
Last check
Passed
3 h ago, next any minute now

Run a free test callHow to call it

Reliability

All checks passedSome failedAll failedNot checked

Status and outage history ยท Atom feed ยท Watch with other listings

How to call it

GET https://402.com.tr/api/x402/commerce-operator-audit

Each call costs $0.05 in USDC on Base, paid with the request over x402.

Run a free test callOne unpaid request, the way an agent sends it. You see the payment challenge it gets back. Nothing is charged.

Example request

From the listing.

GET https://402.com.tr/api/x402/commerce-operator-audit?operator=0x973a31858f4d2125f48c880542da11a2796f12d6

Parameters

ParameterTypeRequiredDescription
operatorstringYesOperator address

Example response

The provider's example. We can't check it without paying.

{
  "checkedAt": "2026-10-11T17:11:19.010Z",
  "distinctPayers": 0,
  "escrow": "0xBdEA0D1bcC5966192B070Fdf62aB4EF5b4420cff",
  "operator": "0x973A31858f4D2125f48C880542DA11a2796f12D6",
  "tokensCount": 0,
  "truncated": true,
  "verdict": "no_activity",
  "windowDays": 90
}

Call it from code

The curl command shows the payment challenge. The JavaScript and Python versions pay and call, and never pay more than $0.05.

curl: see the payment challenge
# bash or zsh: see the payment challenge. Nothing is charged.
curl -sS -g -i 'https://402.com.tr/api/x402/commerce-operator-audit?operator=0x973a31858f4d2125f48c880542da11a2796f12d6'

# x402 v2 sends the challenge base64-encoded in the PAYMENT-REQUIRED header (v1 sends it in the body).
# To read the header:
curl -sS -g -o /dev/null -D - 'https://402.com.tr/api/x402/commerce-operator-audit?operator=0x973a31858f4d2125f48c880542da11a2796f12d6' \
  | grep -i '^payment-required:' | cut -d' ' -f2 | tr -d '\r' | base64 --decode
JavaScript: pay and call
// npm i @x402/fetch @x402/evm viem
import { wrapFetchWithPayment, x402Client } from "@x402/fetch";
import { registerExactEvmScheme } from "@x402/evm/exact/client";
import { privateKeyToAccount } from "viem/accounts";

// Pays at most $0.05 per call.
const client = new x402Client().setSpendControls({ maxAmountPerPayment: "$0.05" });
registerExactEvmScheme(client, { signer: privateKeyToAccount(process.env.EVM_PRIVATE_KEY) });
const pay = wrapFetchWithPayment(fetch, client);

// Not sure it's safe to pay? ToolVet checks it first for $0.005. Pay for that from a separate
// client: this one is capped at $0.05 per payment. GET https://toolvet.app/api/v1/check?url=https%3A%2F%2F402.com.tr%2Fapi%2Fx402%2Fcommerce-operator-audit
const res = await pay("https://402.com.tr/api/x402/commerce-operator-audit?operator=0x973a31858f4d2125f48c880542da11a2796f12d6");
console.log(res.status, await res.text());
Python: pay and call
# pip install "x402[requests,evm]"
import os
from eth_account import Account
from x402 import x402ClientSync
from x402.http.clients import x402_requests
from x402.mechanisms.evm import EthAccountSigner
from x402.mechanisms.evm.exact.register import register_exact_evm_client

# Pays at most $0.05 per call.
client = x402ClientSync().set_spend_controls({"max_amount_per_payment": "$0.05"})
register_exact_evm_client(client, EthAccountSigner(Account.from_key(os.environ["EVM_PRIVATE_KEY"])))

with x402_requests(client) as session:
    res = session.get("https://402.com.tr/api/x402/commerce-operator-audit?operator=0x973a31858f4d2125f48c880542da11a2796f12d6")
    print(res.status_code, res.text)

Security scan

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