78trust / 100

Income Check

by Settled in Developer tools

x402 APIPassing, checked 32 min ago

Scan one bounty / task / repository URL before working on it: fetches it (GitHub issues and repos via the API), runs the honeypot pattern scan (hidden HTML-comment instructions, prompt injection, credential requests, fork/star anomalies, dead or archived repos, reward anomalies) and returns a trust score, a label and every flag with its reason.

GET
https://settled.tools/v1/income/check
Price
$0.005
per call in USDC
Uptime
100%
last 30 days
Response time
663 ms
993 ms slowest 5%
Last check
Passed
32 min ago, next any minute now

Run a free test callHow to call it

Reliability

All checks passedSome failedAll failedNot checked

Status and outage history · Atom feed · Watch with other listings

How to call it

GET https://settled.tools/v1/income/check

Each call costs $0.005 in USDC on Base, paid with the request over x402.

Run a free test callOne unpaid request, the way an agent sends it. You see the payment challenge it gets back. Nothing is charged.

Example request

From the listing.

GET https://settled.tools/v1/income/check?url=https%3A%2F%2Fgithub.com%2Fowner%2Frepo%2Fissues%2F123

Parameters

ParameterTypeRequiredDescription
urlstringYeshttps URL of a bounty issue, repository, or listing page

Example response

The provider's example. We can't check it without paying.

{
  "flags": [
    {
      "flag": "hidden_instructions",
      "reason": "HTML comment (invisible to humans) contains instructions aimed at an AI agent or asks for secrets"
    }
  ],
  "label": "suspected_honeypot",
  "repo": {
    "forks": 40,
    "stars": 3
  },
  "trust": 12,
  "url": "https://github.com/owner/repo/issues/123"
}

Call it from code

The curl command shows the payment challenge. The JavaScript and Python versions pay and call, and never pay more than $0.005.

curl: see the payment challenge
# bash or zsh: see the payment challenge. Nothing is charged.
curl -sS -g -i 'https://settled.tools/v1/income/check?url=https%3A%2F%2Fgithub.com%2Fowner%2Frepo%2Fissues%2F123'

# x402 v2 sends the challenge base64-encoded in the PAYMENT-REQUIRED header (v1 sends it in the body).
# To read the header:
curl -sS -g -o /dev/null -D - 'https://settled.tools/v1/income/check?url=https%3A%2F%2Fgithub.com%2Fowner%2Frepo%2Fissues%2F123' \
  | grep -i '^payment-required:' | cut -d' ' -f2 | tr -d '\r' | base64 --decode
JavaScript: pay and call
// npm i @x402/fetch @x402/evm viem
import { wrapFetchWithPayment, x402Client } from "@x402/fetch";
import { registerExactEvmScheme } from "@x402/evm/exact/client";
import { privateKeyToAccount } from "viem/accounts";

// Pays at most $0.005 per call.
const client = new x402Client().setSpendControls({ maxAmountPerPayment: "$0.005" });
registerExactEvmScheme(client, { signer: privateKeyToAccount(process.env.EVM_PRIVATE_KEY) });
const pay = wrapFetchWithPayment(fetch, client);

// Not sure it's safe to pay? ToolVet checks it first for $0.005. Pay for that from a separate
// client: this one is capped at $0.005 per payment. GET https://toolvet.app/api/v1/check?url=https%3A%2F%2Fsettled.tools%2Fv1%2Fincome%2Fcheck
const res = await pay("https://settled.tools/v1/income/check?url=https%3A%2F%2Fgithub.com%2Fowner%2Frepo%2Fissues%2F123");
console.log(res.status, await res.text());
Python: pay and call
# pip install "x402[requests,evm]"
import os
from eth_account import Account
from x402 import x402ClientSync
from x402.http.clients import x402_requests
from x402.mechanisms.evm import EthAccountSigner
from x402.mechanisms.evm.exact.register import register_exact_evm_client

# Pays at most $0.005 per call.
client = x402ClientSync().set_spend_controls({"max_amount_per_payment": "$0.005"})
register_exact_evm_client(client, EthAccountSigner(Account.from_key(os.environ["EVM_PRIVATE_KEY"])))

with x402_requests(client) as session:
    res = session.get("https://settled.tools/v1/income/check?url=https%3A%2F%2Fgithub.com%2Fowner%2Frepo%2Fissues%2F123")
    print(res.status_code, res.text)

Security scan

No findings

We scan names, descriptions and tool definitions for hidden instructions and other prompt-injection patterns.

Recent checks

WhenResultHTTPTimePrice
32 min agoPassed402621 ms$0.005
5 h agoPassed402870 ms$0.005
10 h agoPassed40260 ms$0.005
14 h agoPassed402524 ms$0.005
19 h agoPassed402535 ms$0.005
Show 10 older checks
23 h agoPassed402607 ms$0.005
27 h agoPassed402873 ms$0.005
31 h agoPassed402838 ms$0.005
36 h agoPassed402607 ms$0.005
40 h agoPassed402543 ms$0.005
44 h agoPassed402541 ms$0.005
2 days agoPassed402742 ms$0.005
2 days agoPassed402886 ms$0.005
2 days agoPassed402993 ms$0.005
3 days agoPassed402823 ms$0.005