75trust / 100

Price

by tokenguard in Onchain & crypto

x402 APIPassing, checked 1 h ago

Live token price, liquidity, FDV, 24h volume & change via DEX aggregation. Requires `address`. No address to hand — crawling, or discovering this endpoint cold? POST /price/trending answers the same question for the tokens trending right now: no input required, $0.005.

POST https://eltociear-tokenguard.hf.space/price

Last 30 days

All checks passedSome failedAll failedNot checked

Status and outage history · Atom feed

Uptime
100%
Response time
303 ms typical, 452 ms slowest 5%
Last check
1 h ago
Next check
any minute now

How to call it

POST https://eltociear-tokenguard.hf.space/price

Each call costs $0.02 in USDC on Base, paid with the request over x402.

Run a free test callOne unpaid request, the way an agent sends it. You see the payment challenge it gets back. Nothing is charged.

Example request

From the listing.

POST https://eltociear-tokenguard.hf.space/price
content-type: application/json

{
  "address": "0xToken...",
  "chain": "base"
}

Parameters

ParameterTypeRequiredDescription
addressstringYesToken contract address (0x…40 hex)
chainstringNoPreferred chain (default base) One of: base, ethereum, arbitrum, optimism, polygon, bsc.

Example response

The provider's example. We can't check it without paying.

{
  "liquidity_usd": 99000000,
  "price_change_24h_pct": -0.46,
  "price_usd": "1669.94",
  "symbol": "WETH",
  "thin_liquidity": false
}

Call it from code

The curl command shows the payment challenge. The JavaScript and Python versions pay and call, and never pay more than $0.02.

curl: see the payment challenge
# bash or zsh: see the payment challenge. Nothing is charged.
curl -sS -g -i -X POST 'https://eltociear-tokenguard.hf.space/price' \
  -H 'content-type: application/json' \
  --data-raw '{"address":"0xToken...","chain":"base"}'

# x402 v2 sends the challenge base64-encoded in the PAYMENT-REQUIRED header (v1 sends it in the body).
# To read the header:
curl -sS -g -o /dev/null -D - -X POST 'https://eltociear-tokenguard.hf.space/price' \
  -H 'content-type: application/json' \
  --data-raw '{"address":"0xToken...","chain":"base"}' \
  | grep -i '^payment-required:' | cut -d' ' -f2 | tr -d '\r' | base64 --decode
JavaScript: pay and call
// npm i @x402/fetch @x402/evm viem
import { wrapFetchWithPayment, x402Client } from "@x402/fetch";
import { registerExactEvmScheme } from "@x402/evm/exact/client";
import { privateKeyToAccount } from "viem/accounts";

// Pays at most $0.02 per call.
const client = new x402Client().setSpendControls({ maxAmountPerPayment: "$0.02" });
registerExactEvmScheme(client, { signer: privateKeyToAccount(process.env.EVM_PRIVATE_KEY) });
const pay = wrapFetchWithPayment(fetch, client);

// Not sure it's safe to pay? ToolVet checks it first for $0.005. Pay for that from a separate
// client: this one is capped at $0.02 per payment. GET https://toolvet.app/api/v1/check?url=https%3A%2F%2Feltociear-tokenguard.hf.space%2Fprice&method=POST
const res = await pay("https://eltociear-tokenguard.hf.space/price", {
  method: "POST",
  headers: { "content-type": "application/json" },
  body: JSON.stringify({
    "address": "0xToken...",
    "chain": "base"
  }),
});
console.log(res.status, await res.text());
Python: pay and call
# pip install "x402[requests,evm]"
import os
from eth_account import Account
from x402 import x402ClientSync
from x402.http.clients import x402_requests
from x402.mechanisms.evm import EthAccountSigner
from x402.mechanisms.evm.exact.register import register_exact_evm_client

# Pays at most $0.02 per call.
client = x402ClientSync().set_spend_controls({"max_amount_per_payment": "$0.02"})
register_exact_evm_client(client, EthAccountSigner(Account.from_key(os.environ["EVM_PRIVATE_KEY"])))

with x402_requests(client) as session:
    res = session.post(
        "https://eltociear-tokenguard.hf.space/price",
        json={
            "address": "0xToken...",
            "chain": "base",
        },
    )
    print(res.status_code, res.text)

Security scan

  • No findings. We scan names, descriptions and tool definitions for hidden instructions and other prompt-injection patterns.

Recent checks

WhenResultHTTPTimePrice
1 h agoPassed402324 ms$0.02
6 h agoPassed402308 ms$0.02
10 h agoPassed402453 ms$0.02
14 h agoPassed402280 ms$0.02
17 h agoPassed402239 ms$0.02
21 h agoPassed402303 ms$0.02
25 h agoPassed402367 ms$0.02
29 h agoPassed402452 ms$0.02
33 h agoPassed402335 ms$0.02
36 h agoPassed402330 ms$0.02
40 h agoPassed402323 ms$0.02
43 h agoPassed402212 ms$0.02
47 h agoPassed402114 ms$0.02
2 days agoPassed402306 ms$0.02
2 days agoPassed402309 ms$0.02