ToolVet
78trust / 100

Relay Health

by nostr.halowerk.com in Other

x402 APIPassing, checked 3 h ago

Every relay is measured twice over. Over WebSocket a genuine REQ query is sent and the connection time, the time to end of stored events and the number of events returned are recorded — a relay that accepts the connection and then stays silent is the failure mode a reachability ping cannot see.

POST https://nostr.halowerk.com/relay-health

Last 30 days

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Status and outage history · Atom feed

Uptime
100%
Response time
128 ms typical, 154 ms slowest 5%
Last check
3 h ago
Next check
any minute now

How to call it

POST https://nostr.halowerk.com/relay-health

Each call costs $0.003 in USDC on Base, paid with the request over x402.

Run a free test callOne unpaid request, the way an agent sends it. You see the payment challenge it gets back. Nothing is charged.

Example request

From the listing.

POST https://nostr.halowerk.com/relay-health
content-type: application/json

{
  "relays": [
    "beispiel"
  ],
  "timeout_ms": 4000
}

Parameters

ParameterTypeRequiredDescription
probe_kindintegerNoEvent kind used for the probe query. Default: 1.
read_nip11booleanNoAlso read the NIP-11 information document over https. Default: true.
relaysarray of stringNowss relay addresses. Left empty, ten measured default relays are used.
timeout_msintegerNoTime limit per relay in milliseconds. Default: 4000.

Example response

The listing has no example response.

Call it from code

The curl command shows the payment challenge. The JavaScript and Python versions pay and call, and never pay more than $0.003.

curl: see the payment challenge
# bash or zsh: see the payment challenge. Nothing is charged.
curl -sS -g -i -X POST 'https://nostr.halowerk.com/relay-health' \
  -H 'content-type: application/json' \
  --data-raw '{"relays":["beispiel"],"timeout_ms":4000}'

# x402 v2 sends the challenge base64-encoded in the PAYMENT-REQUIRED header (v1 sends it in the body).
# To read the header:
curl -sS -g -o /dev/null -D - -X POST 'https://nostr.halowerk.com/relay-health' \
  -H 'content-type: application/json' \
  --data-raw '{"relays":["beispiel"],"timeout_ms":4000}' \
  | grep -i '^payment-required:' | cut -d' ' -f2 | tr -d '\r' | base64 --decode
JavaScript: pay and call
// npm i @x402/fetch @x402/evm viem
import { wrapFetchWithPayment, x402Client } from "@x402/fetch";
import { registerExactEvmScheme } from "@x402/evm/exact/client";
import { privateKeyToAccount } from "viem/accounts";

// Pays at most $0.003 per call.
const client = new x402Client().setSpendControls({ maxAmountPerPayment: "$0.003" });
registerExactEvmScheme(client, { signer: privateKeyToAccount(process.env.EVM_PRIVATE_KEY) });
const pay = wrapFetchWithPayment(fetch, client);

// Not sure it's safe to pay? ToolVet checks it first for $0.005. Pay for that from a separate
// client: this one is capped at $0.003 per payment. GET https://toolvet.app/api/v1/check?url=https%3A%2F%2Fnostr.halowerk.com%2Frelay-health&method=POST
const res = await pay("https://nostr.halowerk.com/relay-health", {
  method: "POST",
  headers: { "content-type": "application/json" },
  body: JSON.stringify({
    "relays": [
      "beispiel"
    ],
    "timeout_ms": 4000
  }),
});
console.log(res.status, await res.text());
Python: pay and call
# pip install "x402[requests,evm]"
import os
from eth_account import Account
from x402 import x402ClientSync
from x402.http.clients import x402_requests
from x402.mechanisms.evm import EthAccountSigner
from x402.mechanisms.evm.exact.register import register_exact_evm_client

# Pays at most $0.003 per call.
client = x402ClientSync().set_spend_controls({"max_amount_per_payment": "$0.003"})
register_exact_evm_client(client, EthAccountSigner(Account.from_key(os.environ["EVM_PRIVATE_KEY"])))

with x402_requests(client) as session:
    res = session.post(
        "https://nostr.halowerk.com/relay-health",
        json={
            "relays": [
                "beispiel",
            ],
            "timeout_ms": 4000,
        },
    )
    print(res.status_code, res.text)

Security scan

  • No findings. We scan names, descriptions and tool definitions for hidden instructions and other prompt-injection patterns.

Recent checks

WhenResultHTTPTimePrice
3 h agoPassed40230 ms$0.003
7 h agoPassed40235 ms$0.003
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