ToolVet
73trust / 100

Sanctions Check

by api.agentfeeds.jp in Security & trust

x402 APIPassing, checked 29 min ago

Screen a crypto address (EVM/BTC/TRON etc.) against Japan MOF asset-freeze sanctions designations (外為法・資産凍結措置). Returns match status with designated-entity details and list date. Source: Ministry of Finance Japan official CSV, updated daily. Factual screening data; not legal advice. Free meta sample: /v1/sample/reg.sanctions

GET
https://api.agentfeeds.jp/v1/reg/sanctions/check
Price
$0.002
per call in USDC
Uptime
100%
last 30 days
Response time
867 ms
916 ms slowest 5%
Last check
Passed
29 min ago, next any minute now

Run a free test callHow to call it

Reliability

All checks passedSome failedAll failedNot checked

Status and outage history · Atom feed

How to call it

GET https://api.agentfeeds.jp/v1/reg/sanctions/check

Each call costs $0.002 in USDC on Base, paid with the request over x402.

Run a free test callOne unpaid request, the way an agent sends it. You see the payment challenge it gets back. Nothing is charged.

Example request

From the listing.

GET https://api.agentfeeds.jp/v1/reg/sanctions/check?address=0xa0e1c89Ef1a489c9C7dE96311eD5Ce5D32c20E4B

Parameters

ParameterTypeRequiredDescription
addressstringYescrypto address to screen (20-100 alphanumeric)

Example response

The provider's example. We can't check it without paying.

{
  "data": {
    "address": "0xa0e1…",
    "entries": [
      {
        "chain_hint": "evm",
        "entity_type": "団体",
        "entry_no": "016-000068",
        "name_en": "Lazarus Group",
        "notice_date": "2022.12.2"
      }
    ],
    "list_date": "2026-07-15",
    "matched": true,
    "screened_against": 26
  },
  "kind": "factual_data",
  "product": "reg.sanctions_check"
}

Call it from code

The curl command shows the payment challenge. The JavaScript and Python versions pay and call, and never pay more than $0.002.

curl: see the payment challenge
# bash or zsh: see the payment challenge. Nothing is charged.
curl -sS -g -i 'https://api.agentfeeds.jp/v1/reg/sanctions/check?address=0xa0e1c89Ef1a489c9C7dE96311eD5Ce5D32c20E4B'

# x402 v2 sends the challenge base64-encoded in the PAYMENT-REQUIRED header (v1 sends it in the body).
# To read the header:
curl -sS -g -o /dev/null -D - 'https://api.agentfeeds.jp/v1/reg/sanctions/check?address=0xa0e1c89Ef1a489c9C7dE96311eD5Ce5D32c20E4B' \
  | grep -i '^payment-required:' | cut -d' ' -f2 | tr -d '\r' | base64 --decode
JavaScript: pay and call
// npm i @x402/fetch @x402/evm viem
import { wrapFetchWithPayment, x402Client } from "@x402/fetch";
import { registerExactEvmScheme } from "@x402/evm/exact/client";
import { privateKeyToAccount } from "viem/accounts";

// Pays at most $0.002 per call.
const client = new x402Client().setSpendControls({ maxAmountPerPayment: "$0.002" });
registerExactEvmScheme(client, { signer: privateKeyToAccount(process.env.EVM_PRIVATE_KEY) });
const pay = wrapFetchWithPayment(fetch, client);

// Not sure it's safe to pay? ToolVet checks it first for $0.005. Pay for that from a separate
// client: this one is capped at $0.002 per payment. GET https://toolvet.app/api/v1/check?url=https%3A%2F%2Fapi.agentfeeds.jp%2Fv1%2Freg%2Fsanctions%2Fcheck
const res = await pay("https://api.agentfeeds.jp/v1/reg/sanctions/check?address=0xa0e1c89Ef1a489c9C7dE96311eD5Ce5D32c20E4B");
console.log(res.status, await res.text());
Python: pay and call
# pip install "x402[requests,evm]"
import os
from eth_account import Account
from x402 import x402ClientSync
from x402.http.clients import x402_requests
from x402.mechanisms.evm import EthAccountSigner
from x402.mechanisms.evm.exact.register import register_exact_evm_client

# Pays at most $0.002 per call.
client = x402ClientSync().set_spend_controls({"max_amount_per_payment": "$0.002"})
register_exact_evm_client(client, EthAccountSigner(Account.from_key(os.environ["EVM_PRIVATE_KEY"])))

with x402_requests(client) as session:
    res = session.get("https://api.agentfeeds.jp/v1/reg/sanctions/check?address=0xa0e1c89Ef1a489c9C7dE96311eD5Ce5D32c20E4B")
    print(res.status_code, res.text)

Security scan

No findings

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Recent checks

WhenResultHTTPTimePrice
29 min agoPassed402817 ms$0.002
5 h agoPassed4021.3 s$0.002
9 h agoPassed402878 ms$0.002
13 h agoPassed402916 ms$0.002
17 h agoPassed402928 ms$0.002
Show 10 older checks
21 h agoPassed402846 ms$0.002
25 h agoPassed402832 ms$0.002
28 h agoPassed402837 ms$0.002
32 h agoPassed402884 ms$0.002
36 h agoPassed402284 ms$0.002
39 h agoPassed402875 ms$0.002
43 h agoPassed402914 ms$0.002
47 h agoPassed402283 ms$0.002
2 days agoPassed402279 ms$0.002
2 days agoPassed402867 ms$0.002