ToolVet
77trust / 100

Supply Inflation

by Supply Inflation in Markets & finance

x402 APIPassing, checked 2 h ago

owner-powers says the owner CAN mint; this says whether they ARE, and how fast. A token can advertise fixed supply and quietly inflate it, diluting holders before the dump. Sums zero-address mints and burns over a window (CDP SQL) against live on-chain totalSupply, annualised. Verdict from fixed_in_window / deflationary to hyperinflation. Honest: bridges, staking and LP programs mint legitimately — flags the RATE, not intent. Not financial advice.

GET
https://402.com.tr/api/x402/supply-inflation
Price
$0.03
per call in USDC
Uptime
100%
last 30 days
Response time
464 ms
662 ms slowest 5%
Last check
Passed
2 h ago, next any minute now

Run a free test callHow to call it

Reliability

All checks passedSome failedAll failedNot checked

Status and outage history · Atom feed · Watch with other listings

How to call it

GET https://402.com.tr/api/x402/supply-inflation

Each call costs $0.03 in USDC on Base, paid with the request over x402.

Run a free test callOne unpaid request, the way an agent sends it. You see the payment challenge it gets back. Nothing is charged.

Example request

From the listing.

GET https://402.com.tr/api/x402/supply-inflation?address=0x4ed4E862860beD51a9570b96d89aF5E1B0Efefed&days=30

Parameters

ParameterTypeRequiredDescription
addressstringYesToken contract address
daysstringNoWindow days (default 30, max 45)

Example response

The provider's example. We can't check it without paying.

{
  "address": "0x4ed4E862860beD51a9570b96d89aF5E1B0Efefed",
  "burnEvents": 98,
  "decimals": 18,
  "lastMintAt": null,
  "mintEvents": 0,
  "totalSupply": 36022856741.708916,
  "verdict": "deflationary",
  "windowDays": 30
}

Call it from code

The curl command shows the payment challenge. The JavaScript and Python versions pay and call, and never pay more than $0.03.

curl: see the payment challenge
# bash or zsh: see the payment challenge. Nothing is charged.
curl -sS -g -i 'https://402.com.tr/api/x402/supply-inflation?address=0x4ed4E862860beD51a9570b96d89aF5E1B0Efefed&days=30'

# x402 v2 sends the challenge base64-encoded in the PAYMENT-REQUIRED header (v1 sends it in the body).
# To read the header:
curl -sS -g -o /dev/null -D - 'https://402.com.tr/api/x402/supply-inflation?address=0x4ed4E862860beD51a9570b96d89aF5E1B0Efefed&days=30' \
  | grep -i '^payment-required:' | cut -d' ' -f2 | tr -d '\r' | base64 --decode
JavaScript: pay and call
// npm i @x402/fetch @x402/evm viem
import { wrapFetchWithPayment, x402Client } from "@x402/fetch";
import { registerExactEvmScheme } from "@x402/evm/exact/client";
import { privateKeyToAccount } from "viem/accounts";

// Pays at most $0.03 per call.
const client = new x402Client().setSpendControls({ maxAmountPerPayment: "$0.03" });
registerExactEvmScheme(client, { signer: privateKeyToAccount(process.env.EVM_PRIVATE_KEY) });
const pay = wrapFetchWithPayment(fetch, client);

// Not sure it's safe to pay? ToolVet checks it first for $0.005. Pay for that from a separate
// client: this one is capped at $0.03 per payment. GET https://toolvet.app/api/v1/check?url=https%3A%2F%2F402.com.tr%2Fapi%2Fx402%2Fsupply-inflation
const res = await pay("https://402.com.tr/api/x402/supply-inflation?address=0x4ed4E862860beD51a9570b96d89aF5E1B0Efefed&days=30");
console.log(res.status, await res.text());
Python: pay and call
# pip install "x402[requests,evm]"
import os
from eth_account import Account
from x402 import x402ClientSync
from x402.http.clients import x402_requests
from x402.mechanisms.evm import EthAccountSigner
from x402.mechanisms.evm.exact.register import register_exact_evm_client

# Pays at most $0.03 per call.
client = x402ClientSync().set_spend_controls({"max_amount_per_payment": "$0.03"})
register_exact_evm_client(client, EthAccountSigner(Account.from_key(os.environ["EVM_PRIVATE_KEY"])))

with x402_requests(client) as session:
    res = session.get("https://402.com.tr/api/x402/supply-inflation?address=0x4ed4E862860beD51a9570b96d89aF5E1B0Efefed&days=30")
    print(res.status_code, res.text)

Security scan

No findings

We scan names, descriptions and tool definitions for hidden instructions and other prompt-injection patterns.

Recent checks

WhenResultHTTPTimePrice
2 h agoPassed402473 ms$0.03
7 h agoPassed402676 ms$0.03
12 h agoPassed402423 ms$0.03
16 h agoPassed402511 ms$0.03
21 h agoPassed402587 ms$0.03
Show 10 older checks
25 h agoPassed402480 ms$0.03
29 h agoPassed402603 ms$0.03
33 h agoPassed402464 ms$0.03
38 h agoPassed402485 ms$0.03
42 h agoPassed402514 ms$0.03
46 h agoPassed402449 ms$0.03
2 days agoPassed402406 ms$0.03
2 days agoPassed402448 ms$0.03
2 days agoPassed402441 ms$0.03
3 days agoPassed402446 ms$0.03