Tgm Who Bought Sold
by canaryguard-402.onrender.com in Onchain & crypto
Analyzes who bought and sold a specific Solana or Base token over the last 24h, segmented by Smart Money, Whales, Fresh Wallets, and Dev Clusters.
https://canaryguard-402.onrender.com/api/v1/tgm/who-bought-sold- Price
- $0.01
- per call in USDC
- Uptime
- 72.7%
- last 30 days
- Response time
- 251 ms
- 758 ms slowest 5%
- Last check
- Failed
- 4 h ago, next in 22 h
Reliability
Latest check failed 4 h ago: Expected HTTP 402, got 410
Status and outage history · Atom feed · Watch with other listings
How to call it
POST https://canaryguard-402.onrender.com/api/v1/tgm/who-bought-sold
Each call costs $0.01 in USDC on Base, paid with the request over x402.
Run a free test callOne unpaid request, the way an agent sends it. You see the payment challenge it gets back. Nothing is charged.
Example request
From the listing.
POST https://canaryguard-402.onrender.com/api/v1/tgm/who-bought-sold
content-type: application/json
{
"token_address": "0x0b3e328455c4059EEb9e3f84b5543F74E24e7E1b"
}Parameters
| Parameter | Type | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
token_address | string | No |
Example response
The provider's example. We can't check it without paying.
{
"net_buyer_cohort": "SMART_MONEY_AND_WHALES",
"status": "success",
"top_buyers_usd": 1240000,
"top_sellers_usd": 811100
}Call it from code
The curl command shows the payment challenge. The JavaScript and Python versions pay and call, and never pay more than $0.01.
curl: see the payment challenge
# bash or zsh: see the payment challenge. Nothing is charged.
curl -sS -g -i -X POST 'https://canaryguard-402.onrender.com/api/v1/tgm/who-bought-sold' \
-H 'content-type: application/json' \
--data-raw '{"token_address":"0x0b3e328455c4059EEb9e3f84b5543F74E24e7E1b"}'
# x402 v2 sends the challenge base64-encoded in the PAYMENT-REQUIRED header (v1 sends it in the body).
# To read the header:
curl -sS -g -o /dev/null -D - -X POST 'https://canaryguard-402.onrender.com/api/v1/tgm/who-bought-sold' \
-H 'content-type: application/json' \
--data-raw '{"token_address":"0x0b3e328455c4059EEb9e3f84b5543F74E24e7E1b"}' \
| grep -i '^payment-required:' | cut -d' ' -f2 | tr -d '\r' | base64 --decodeJavaScript: pay and call
// npm i @x402/fetch @x402/evm viem
import { wrapFetchWithPayment, x402Client } from "@x402/fetch";
import { registerExactEvmScheme } from "@x402/evm/exact/client";
import { privateKeyToAccount } from "viem/accounts";
// Pays at most $0.01 per call.
const client = new x402Client().setSpendControls({ maxAmountPerPayment: "$0.01" });
registerExactEvmScheme(client, { signer: privateKeyToAccount(process.env.EVM_PRIVATE_KEY) });
const pay = wrapFetchWithPayment(fetch, client);
// Not sure it's safe to pay? ToolVet checks it first for $0.005. Pay for that from a separate
// client: this one is capped at $0.01 per payment. GET https://toolvet.app/api/v1/check?url=https%3A%2F%2Fcanaryguard-402.onrender.com%2Fapi%2Fv1%2Ftgm%2Fwho-bought-sold&method=POST
const res = await pay("https://canaryguard-402.onrender.com/api/v1/tgm/who-bought-sold", {
method: "POST",
headers: { "content-type": "application/json" },
body: JSON.stringify({
"token_address": "0x0b3e328455c4059EEb9e3f84b5543F74E24e7E1b"
}),
});
console.log(res.status, await res.text());Python: pay and call
# pip install "x402[requests,evm]"
import os
from eth_account import Account
from x402 import x402ClientSync
from x402.http.clients import x402_requests
from x402.mechanisms.evm import EthAccountSigner
from x402.mechanisms.evm.exact.register import register_exact_evm_client
# Pays at most $0.01 per call.
client = x402ClientSync().set_spend_controls({"max_amount_per_payment": "$0.01"})
register_exact_evm_client(client, EthAccountSigner(Account.from_key(os.environ["EVM_PRIVATE_KEY"])))
with x402_requests(client) as session:
res = session.post(
"https://canaryguard-402.onrender.com/api/v1/tgm/who-bought-sold",
json={
"token_address": "0x0b3e328455c4059EEb9e3f84b5543F74E24e7E1b",
},
)
print(res.status_code, res.text)Security scan
No findings
We scan names, descriptions and tool definitions for hidden instructions and other prompt-injection patterns.
Recent checks
| When | Result | HTTP | Time | Price |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 4 h ago | Expected HTTP 402, got 410 | 410 | 322 ms | - |
| 8 h ago | Expected HTTP 402, got 307 | 307 | 234 ms | - |
| 13 h ago | Expected HTTP 402, got 307 | 307 | 231 ms | - |
| 17 h ago | Expected HTTP 402, got 307 | 307 | 650 ms | - |
| 21 h ago | Expected HTTP 402, got 307 | 307 | 674 ms | - |
Show 10 older checks
| 25 h ago | Expected HTTP 402, got 307 | 307 | 606 ms | - |
| 29 h ago | Passed | 402 | 588 ms | $0.01 |
| 33 h ago | Passed | 402 | 251 ms | $0.01 |
| 37 h ago | Passed | 402 | 758 ms | $0.01 |
| 40 h ago | Passed | 402 | 590 ms | $0.01 |
| 44 h ago | Passed | 402 | 251 ms | $0.01 |
| 2 days ago | Passed | 402 | 308 ms | $0.01 |
| 2 days ago | Passed | 402 | 200 ms | $0.01 |
| 2 days ago | Passed | 402 | 262 ms | $0.01 |
| 2 days ago | Passed | 402 | 205 ms | $0.01 |