78trust / 100

Trace

by adctx in Onchain & crypto

x402 APIPassing, checked 3 h ago

Where did this address's money come from, and would it have arrived if the address had not sent it first? Give any Base address, get a live read: distinct payers, how many of them this address funded inside the window, the USDC left once those are removed, and how many funded wallets sent back the exact amount they were given, and how fast. One seller in our weekly reading took in 339.20 USDC, and 338.70 of it was its own money coming back.

GET
https://t.adctx.com/trace
Price
$0.1
per call in USDC
Uptime
100%
last 30 days
Response time
250 ms
319 ms slowest 5%
Last check
Passed
3 h ago, next any minute now

Run a free test callHow to call it

Reliability

All checks passedSome failedAll failedNot checked

Status and outage history · Atom feed · Watch with other listings

How to call it

GET https://t.adctx.com/trace

Each call costs $0.1 in USDC on Base, paid with the request over x402.

Run a free test callOne unpaid request, the way an agent sends it. You see the payment challenge it gets back. Nothing is charged.

Example request

From the listing.

GET https://t.adctx.com/trace?address=0x17cd53c04d707ef0dd615ef56c633f02915a7905&hours=24

Parameters

ParameterTypeRequiredDescription
addressstringYesany Base address, not only a seller
hoursstringNowindow length ending at the chain tip, 24 by default and 168 at most

Example response

The provider's example. We can't check it without paying.

{
  "address": "0x17cd53c04d707ef0dd615ef56c633f02915a7905",
  "arms_length_usdc": "0.5",
  "inbound_usdc": "339.2",
  "ok": true,
  "payers": "55",
  "round_trip": {
    "exact_returns": "49",
    "median_block_gap": "18"
  },
  "self_funded_payers": "51",
  "verdict": "paid",
  "window": {
    "hours": "168.0"
  }
}

Call it from code

The curl command shows the payment challenge. The JavaScript and Python versions pay and call, and never pay more than $0.1.

curl: see the payment challenge
# bash or zsh: see the payment challenge. Nothing is charged.
curl -sS -g -i 'https://t.adctx.com/trace?address=0x17cd53c04d707ef0dd615ef56c633f02915a7905&hours=24'

# x402 v2 sends the challenge base64-encoded in the PAYMENT-REQUIRED header (v1 sends it in the body).
# To read the header:
curl -sS -g -o /dev/null -D - 'https://t.adctx.com/trace?address=0x17cd53c04d707ef0dd615ef56c633f02915a7905&hours=24' \
  | grep -i '^payment-required:' | cut -d' ' -f2 | tr -d '\r' | base64 --decode
JavaScript: pay and call
// npm i @x402/fetch @x402/evm viem
import { wrapFetchWithPayment, x402Client } from "@x402/fetch";
import { registerExactEvmScheme } from "@x402/evm/exact/client";
import { privateKeyToAccount } from "viem/accounts";

// Pays at most $0.1 per call.
const client = new x402Client().setSpendControls({ maxAmountPerPayment: "$0.1" });
registerExactEvmScheme(client, { signer: privateKeyToAccount(process.env.EVM_PRIVATE_KEY) });
const pay = wrapFetchWithPayment(fetch, client);

// Not sure it's safe to pay? ToolVet checks it first for $0.005. Pay for that from a separate
// client: this one is capped at $0.1 per payment. GET https://toolvet.app/api/v1/check?url=https%3A%2F%2Ft.adctx.com%2Ftrace
const res = await pay("https://t.adctx.com/trace?address=0x17cd53c04d707ef0dd615ef56c633f02915a7905&hours=24");
console.log(res.status, await res.text());
Python: pay and call
# pip install "x402[requests,evm]"
import os
from eth_account import Account
from x402 import x402ClientSync
from x402.http.clients import x402_requests
from x402.mechanisms.evm import EthAccountSigner
from x402.mechanisms.evm.exact.register import register_exact_evm_client

# Pays at most $0.1 per call.
client = x402ClientSync().set_spend_controls({"max_amount_per_payment": "$0.1"})
register_exact_evm_client(client, EthAccountSigner(Account.from_key(os.environ["EVM_PRIVATE_KEY"])))

with x402_requests(client) as session:
    res = session.get("https://t.adctx.com/trace?address=0x17cd53c04d707ef0dd615ef56c633f02915a7905&hours=24")
    print(res.status_code, res.text)

Security scan

No findings

We scan names, descriptions and tool definitions for hidden instructions and other prompt-injection patterns.

Recent checks

WhenResultHTTPTimePrice
3 h agoPassed402214 ms$0.1
8 h agoPassed402344 ms$0.1
13 h agoPassed402255 ms$0.1
17 h agoPassed402232 ms$0.1
22 h agoPassed402267 ms$0.1
Show 10 older checks
26 h agoPassed402234 ms$0.1
30 h agoPassed402250 ms$0.1
35 h agoPassed402203 ms$0.1
39 h agoPassed402253 ms$0.1
43 h agoPassed402278 ms$0.1
47 h agoPassed402242 ms$0.1
2 days agoPassed402222 ms$0.1
2 days agoPassed402265 ms$0.1
3 days agoPassed402277 ms$0.1
3 days agoPassed402226 ms$0.1