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Verify Proof

by FractalAI Verify in Security & trust

x402 APIPassing, checked 2 h ago

Pay-per-Verify: an agent pays $0.01 to verify a post-quantum (ML-DSA-65 / Dilithium-3 or Dilithium-2, NIST FIPS 204; scheme auto-detected by size) signature over a message against a public key. A generic machine-to-machine PQC proof primitive for autonomous agents. x402-native.

POST https://fractalai.net.co/api/x402/verify-proof

Last 30 days

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Status and outage history · Atom feed

Uptime
100%
Response time
833 ms typical, 1.0 s slowest 5%
Last check
2 h ago
Next check
any minute now

How to call it

POST https://fractalai.net.co/api/x402/verify-proof

Each call costs $0.01 in USDC on Base, paid with the request over x402.

Run a free test callOne unpaid request, the way an agent sends it. You see the payment challenge it gets back. Nothing is charged.

Example request

From the listing.

POST https://fractalai.net.co/api/x402/verify-proof
content-type: application/json

{
  "message_b64": "BASE64_BYTES",
  "public_key": "BASE64_PK",
  "signature": "BASE64_SIG"
}

Example response

The provider's example. We can't check it without paying.

{
  "algorithm": "ml-dsa-65",
  "valid": true,
  "verified_algorithm": "dilithium2"
}

Call it from code

The curl command shows the payment challenge. The JavaScript and Python versions pay and call, and never pay more than $0.01.

curl: see the payment challenge
# bash or zsh: see the payment challenge. Nothing is charged.
curl -sS -g -i -X POST 'https://fractalai.net.co/api/x402/verify-proof' \
  -H 'content-type: application/json' \
  --data-raw '{"message_b64":"BASE64_BYTES","public_key":"BASE64_PK","signature":"BASE64_SIG"}'

# x402 v2 sends the challenge base64-encoded in the PAYMENT-REQUIRED header (v1 sends it in the body).
# To read the header:
curl -sS -g -o /dev/null -D - -X POST 'https://fractalai.net.co/api/x402/verify-proof' \
  -H 'content-type: application/json' \
  --data-raw '{"message_b64":"BASE64_BYTES","public_key":"BASE64_PK","signature":"BASE64_SIG"}' \
  | grep -i '^payment-required:' | cut -d' ' -f2 | tr -d '\r' | base64 --decode
JavaScript: pay and call
// npm i @x402/fetch @x402/evm viem
import { wrapFetchWithPayment, x402Client } from "@x402/fetch";
import { registerExactEvmScheme } from "@x402/evm/exact/client";
import { privateKeyToAccount } from "viem/accounts";

// Pays at most $0.01 per call.
const client = new x402Client().setSpendControls({ maxAmountPerPayment: "$0.01" });
registerExactEvmScheme(client, { signer: privateKeyToAccount(process.env.EVM_PRIVATE_KEY) });
const pay = wrapFetchWithPayment(fetch, client);

// Not sure it's safe to pay? ToolVet checks it first for $0.005. Pay for that from a separate
// client: this one is capped at $0.01 per payment. GET https://toolvet.app/api/v1/check?url=https%3A%2F%2Ffractalai.net.co%2Fapi%2Fx402%2Fverify-proof&method=POST
const res = await pay("https://fractalai.net.co/api/x402/verify-proof", {
  method: "POST",
  headers: { "content-type": "application/json" },
  body: JSON.stringify({
    "message_b64": "BASE64_BYTES",
    "public_key": "BASE64_PK",
    "signature": "BASE64_SIG"
  }),
});
console.log(res.status, await res.text());
Python: pay and call
# pip install "x402[requests,evm]"
import os
from eth_account import Account
from x402 import x402ClientSync
from x402.http.clients import x402_requests
from x402.mechanisms.evm import EthAccountSigner
from x402.mechanisms.evm.exact.register import register_exact_evm_client

# Pays at most $0.01 per call.
client = x402ClientSync().set_spend_controls({"max_amount_per_payment": "$0.01"})
register_exact_evm_client(client, EthAccountSigner(Account.from_key(os.environ["EVM_PRIVATE_KEY"])))

with x402_requests(client) as session:
    res = session.post(
        "https://fractalai.net.co/api/x402/verify-proof",
        json={
            "message_b64": "BASE64_BYTES",
            "public_key": "BASE64_PK",
            "signature": "BASE64_SIG",
        },
    )
    print(res.status_code, res.text)

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