77trust / 100

Wash Trading

by Wash Trading Check in Markets & finance

x402 APIPassing, checked 4 h ago

Hot volume is often fake. This reads a token's transfer events and flags the wash/circular shape: the share of transfers round-tripping through addresses active on BOTH the send and receive side, plus participant concentration. Returns clean / elevated / likely_wash with the top round-trippers. A heuristic signal, not proof — LPs and routers legitimately sit on both sides — so size off it, don't convict on it. Pass days= (default 7). Not financial advice.

GET
https://402.com.tr/api/x402/wash-trading
Price
$0.05
per call in USDC
Uptime
100%
last 30 days
Response time
458 ms
579 ms slowest 5%
Last check
Passed
4 h ago, next any minute now

Run a free test callHow to call it

Reliability

All checks passedSome failedAll failedNot checked

Status and outage history · Atom feed · Watch with other listings

How to call it

GET https://402.com.tr/api/x402/wash-trading

Each call costs $0.05 in USDC on Base, paid with the request over x402.

Run a free test callOne unpaid request, the way an agent sends it. You see the payment challenge it gets back. Nothing is charged.

Example request

From the listing.

GET https://402.com.tr/api/x402/wash-trading?address=0x4ed4E862860beD51a9570b96d89aF5E1B0Efefed&days=7

Parameters

ParameterTypeRequiredDescription
addressstringYesToken contract address
daysstringNoWindow days (default 7, max 30)

Example response

The provider's example. We can't check it without paying.

{
  "address": "0x4ed4e862860bed51a9570b96d89af5e1b0efefed",
  "checkedAt": "2026-10-11T17:11:33.928Z",
  "days": 7,
  "distinctParticipants": 2620,
  "roundTripPct": 42.7,
  "totalTransfers": 22640,
  "transfersPerParticipant": 8.6,
  "verdict": "likely_wash"
}

Call it from code

The curl command shows the payment challenge. The JavaScript and Python versions pay and call, and never pay more than $0.05.

curl: see the payment challenge
# bash or zsh: see the payment challenge. Nothing is charged.
curl -sS -g -i 'https://402.com.tr/api/x402/wash-trading?address=0x4ed4E862860beD51a9570b96d89aF5E1B0Efefed&days=7'

# x402 v2 sends the challenge base64-encoded in the PAYMENT-REQUIRED header (v1 sends it in the body).
# To read the header:
curl -sS -g -o /dev/null -D - 'https://402.com.tr/api/x402/wash-trading?address=0x4ed4E862860beD51a9570b96d89aF5E1B0Efefed&days=7' \
  | grep -i '^payment-required:' | cut -d' ' -f2 | tr -d '\r' | base64 --decode
JavaScript: pay and call
// npm i @x402/fetch @x402/evm viem
import { wrapFetchWithPayment, x402Client } from "@x402/fetch";
import { registerExactEvmScheme } from "@x402/evm/exact/client";
import { privateKeyToAccount } from "viem/accounts";

// Pays at most $0.05 per call.
const client = new x402Client().setSpendControls({ maxAmountPerPayment: "$0.05" });
registerExactEvmScheme(client, { signer: privateKeyToAccount(process.env.EVM_PRIVATE_KEY) });
const pay = wrapFetchWithPayment(fetch, client);

// Not sure it's safe to pay? ToolVet checks it first for $0.005. Pay for that from a separate
// client: this one is capped at $0.05 per payment. GET https://toolvet.app/api/v1/check?url=https%3A%2F%2F402.com.tr%2Fapi%2Fx402%2Fwash-trading
const res = await pay("https://402.com.tr/api/x402/wash-trading?address=0x4ed4E862860beD51a9570b96d89aF5E1B0Efefed&days=7");
console.log(res.status, await res.text());
Python: pay and call
# pip install "x402[requests,evm]"
import os
from eth_account import Account
from x402 import x402ClientSync
from x402.http.clients import x402_requests
from x402.mechanisms.evm import EthAccountSigner
from x402.mechanisms.evm.exact.register import register_exact_evm_client

# Pays at most $0.05 per call.
client = x402ClientSync().set_spend_controls({"max_amount_per_payment": "$0.05"})
register_exact_evm_client(client, EthAccountSigner(Account.from_key(os.environ["EVM_PRIVATE_KEY"])))

with x402_requests(client) as session:
    res = session.get("https://402.com.tr/api/x402/wash-trading?address=0x4ed4E862860beD51a9570b96d89aF5E1B0Efefed&days=7")
    print(res.status_code, res.text)

Security scan

No findings

We scan names, descriptions and tool definitions for hidden instructions and other prompt-injection patterns.

Recent checks

WhenResultHTTPTimePrice
4 h agoPassed402504 ms$0.05
8 h agoPassed402452 ms$0.05
13 h agoPassed402419 ms$0.05
18 h agoPassed402433 ms$0.05
22 h agoPassed402405 ms$0.05
Show 10 older checks
27 h agoPassed402374 ms$0.05
30 h agoPassed402451 ms$0.05
35 h agoPassed402579 ms$0.05
39 h agoPassed402539 ms$0.05
43 h agoPassed402458 ms$0.05
2 days agoPassed402540 ms$0.05
2 days agoPassed402435 ms$0.05
2 days agoPassed402452 ms$0.05
3 days agoPassed402434 ms$0.05
3 days agoPassed402404 ms$0.05